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Catholic Health Care Cooperation: 
Why Rewrite the 
Ethical and Religious Directives? 
by 
The Most Reverend John C. Nienstedt 
Auxiliary Bishop of Detroit 
For over six years, I have served as chair of the Archdiocese of Detroit's 
Committee for Health Care Ethics Representatives. In this short period of 
time, Cardinal Maida has asked me to review a half dozen proposals for 
cooperative mergers involving Catholic health care systems. For this 
reason alone, the current discussion in the National Conference of Catholic 
Bishops on proposed changes to their 1995 Ethical and Religious 
Directives for Catholic Health Care Services is of major interest to me. 
The bishops' discussion seeks to clarify the moral principles involving 
formal and material cooperation with immoral activities relative to specific 
instances where those principles apply to such institutional cooperative , 
ventures as the ones I have been asked to study and evaluate. 
In recent years, the cost of health care has skyrocketed as health care 
systems have tried to contain costs and curtailing services. The creation of 
HMOs was aimed at cutting costs. The government, too, has put pressure 
on the health care market by limiting the number and amount of care it 
would reimburse. The result has been that individual health care systems 
have looked for other institutions to form cooperative relationships. 
Ventures have sometimes involved: 1) two Catholic institutions; 2) a 
Catholic and another denominational institution; or 3) a Catholic and a non-
denominational (secular) institution . In almost every instance, the 
arrangements are unique with regard to board policy participation, assets, 
administrative structure, revenue sharing and the like. The details are 
complex. Often legally binding obligations are incurred. 
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Yet there are also far-reaching moral obligations that arise as well. 
The most common are sterilization and other contraceptive services offered 
by a non-Catholic partner. Can a Catholic health system be morally 
justified to enter into such a partnership? If so, what are the conditions 
that would ensure its moral justification? It is here that traditional Catholic 
principles of cooperation are invoked. However, it must be said from the 
outset that the present contemporary situation does not reflect the 
"traditional" moral circumstances under which those Catholic principles 
have hitherto been applied. Allow me to explain. 
I might be aware that a close friend of mine is in dire financial 
difficulty. He comes to me and tells me that he has decided to rob a bank 
and asks if I would lend him a gun to do so. Agreeing to his request 
constitutes formal cooperation. But, given another scenario, the friend 
doesn ' t tell me his intentions, though I suspect in his desperation he may 
use the gun to do some harm. My cooperation would also be wrong. (The 
same could be said of a bartender who sells additional drinks to an 
inebriated client knowing that he plans to drive home.) 
Formal cooperation is any form of assisting, advising or counseling 
that would directly cooperate in intending an immoral action. Material 
cooperation refers to any form of assisting, advising or counseling that 
seeks the good that is being done from an action and only indirectly the 
evil, which evil the cooperator would prevent if he could. In this case, the 
person does not join in the immoral attention of another. Immediate 
material cooperation, while not sharing in the intention of the agent, 
nevertheless provides the means whereby the agent is able to realize his 
evil purpose. Remote material cooperation, on the other hand, involves 
non-participation in the intention of the doer of the immoral deed and a 
cooperation that would not, in itself, assist the evil to' occur. Lending my 
car to a friend without knowing his intentions to rob a bank would 
constitute remote material cooperation. 
Material cooperation can be morally justified under three conditions: 
1) Refusal to cooperate wou Id result in a greater evil; 
2) The cooperation is not immediate, but remote; 
3) There is no serious degree of scandal involved. 
The classic example used in the moral textbooks to illustrate 
legitimate material cooperation is that of a Catholic nurse whose only 
chance of employment as a nurse is in a secular hospital where, among 
other responsibilities, she is assigned to care for women after they have had 
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abortions. The nurse needs this job to feed her family. She finds herself in 
a situation of duress, brought about through no fault of her own. Since she 
does not directly assist the patient in the decision' to have an abortion and 
the material cooperation she offers is remote, and while harm could come 
to her family if she refused this job, the textbooks indicate she could 
perform her role in · good conscience, provided she avoids giving scandal, 
that is to say, the matter remains an internal judgment without pUblicity. 
However, this same decision in favor of material cooperation cannot 
be considered a permanent one. Circumstances may change, i.e., a new 
Catholic hospital is opened in the local area; the nurse's children grow up 
and leave home; the hospital demands her more immediate cooperation in 
abortions. With changing circumstances, the cooperation of the individual 
must be morally reassessed. This is especially true of a situation where the 
person cooperates out of a sense of duress. That duress should never be 
judged as a permanent condition nor should the cooperation that it causes 
be considered permanent. 
Up until now we have been applying the principles of cooperation to 
an individual with his/her own conscience. That person is able to weigh all 
the factors involved in his/her case and make a prudential moral judgment. 
That person is also free to reassess the situation in light of experience or 
changing circumstances. 
The Ethical and Religious Directives, on the other hand, address 
themselves to institutional forms of cooperation. As a juridic person, the 
institution utilizes a different form of moral reasoning than that of the 
individual person. Policies govern actions and policies are decided 
collectively. A hospital board may make a decision by consensus, 
compromise, or majority vote. A trustee who objects to an immoral policy 
may be overruled and forced to go along with the board 's decision or quit. 
But his resignation does not stop the implementation of the policy. 
Moreover, hospital cooperative ventures are controlled over long 
periods of time by a contract, which is a public document specifying 
serious procedural and financial obligations. A Catholic health care system 
may be faced with financial duress at the time it seeks cooperation with 
another institution, but circumstances could well change, eliminating that 
duress . Afterwards, however, the Catholic institution finds itself locked 
into a contract from which it cannot escape. 
When the Catholic principles of cooperation were devised, it would 
have been impossible to envision the complex moral challenge that faces us 
today with so many diverse cooperative ventures between health care 
systems. We are quite literally in a new area of moral reasoning where 
distinctions and details do make a difference. The principles of 
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cooperation do not readily apply in the same way or with the same moral 
results to an institution as they do to an individual. 
The bishops are very much aware of this fact after five years' 
experience with the Ethical and Religious Directives . Together with the 
Catholic Health Association, they are providing the leadership for a 
reassessment of the moral soundness of Catholic health care cooperative 
ventures in order to ensure their reliability to lead Catholics and others 
closer to God and to salvation. 
That reliability, however, rests on a clear articulation of what the 
Church believes in the area of contraception, sterilization and abortion. 
Obviously these concerns are not of the same medical weight, but they are 
of the same moral gravity. Each in its own way fails to uphold the dignity 
of the human person and frustrates the naturally intended ends of that 
person ' s reproductive potential , thus proving to be intrinsically "anti-life ." 
In an age where the mind-body dichotomy is so pervasive, it is essential to 
assert that what one does with one ' s body either promotes or negates the 
good which one is called to achieve. Such a negation is what the Scripture 
objectively defines as sin . 
This then brings us back to the overall point of this discussion: one 
may not cooperate with another in committing evil. To do so impedes the 
salvation of the moral agent as well as the one who cooperates. Pope John 
Paul II explains why this is so in his encyclical Evangelium Vitae: 
Indeed, from the moral standpoint, it is never licit to cooperate 
formally in evil. Such cooperation occurs when an action, either by its 
very nature or by the form it takes in a concrete situation, can be 
defined as a direct participation in an act against innocent human life 
or a sharing in the immoral intention of the person co~itting it. This 
cooperation can never be justified either by invoking respect for the 
freedom of others or by appealing to the fact that civil law permits it 
or requires it. Each individual in fact has moral responsibility for the 
acts which he personally performs; no one can be exempted from this 
responsibility, and on the basis of it everyone will be judged by God 
Hirnself(cfRom 2:6; 14:12). 
(Evangelium Vitae, 74) 
The concerns involved in the present discussion of the Ethical and 
Religious Directives are as serious as they are complex. Administrators, 
doctors, lawyers, nursing staffs, chaplains, religious, bishops and the laity 
alike have a stake in making sure that not only do Catholic health care 
institutions provide good medical treatment, but that the medical treatment 
provided is morally good in itself. 
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